The legal controversy at issue in the case is whether the taking of private property for transfer to another private entity for redevelopment purposes constitutes a "public use" under the Fifth Amendment. A majority of the Connecticut Supreme Court, relying on both federal and state court precedents, rejected the claim of several New London home owners that the intended transfer of the property to a private entity disqualified the taking as a public use." See Kelo v. City of New London (SC16742)(Concurrence and Dissent)

Click here for a detailed analysis of the case.

Click here to read the briefs submitted in the United States Supreme Court.

State v. Ross (SC17335) (Concurrence) (Concurrence)

State v. Gonzalez (SC16977) (Dissent)

Boone v. William W. Backus Hospital (SC17204)

Cecarelli v. Board of Assessment Appeals (SC17234)

New Haven v. Bonner (SC17142)

Denardo v. Bergamo (SC17200)

In State v. Alston (SC16910) the Court affirmed manslaughter and firearms convictions nothwithstanding the defendant's claim that the prosecution had been unfairly allowed to comment on the defendant's invocation of his Fifth Amendment rights against self-incrimination. Rejecting the defendant's claims, the Court held that the prosecutor's comment was not impermissible because it was either fair comment on the defendant's failure to explain prior inconsistent statements or mere narrative of the chain of events leading up to the defendant's arrest. The Supreme Court also rejected claims by the defendant that the trial court had acted improperly in handling possible juror misconduct and in replacing a juror who had been selected in voir dire, but not yet sworn.

In Dept. of Transportation v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities (SC16889) the Court considered whether an employer who had a bona fide, non-discriminatory reason for not promoting an employee could be liable for employment discrimination where the CHRO also concluded that the employee was not given the promotion because of his national origin. After transferring the case to its docket, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court, holding that, as a matter of law, the fact that the employee was not promoted for at least one bona fide, non-discriminatory reason precluded a determination that the employer had nevertheless acted with a discriminatory motive.

In two companion cases, Connecticut State Medical Society v. ConnectiCare, Inc. (SC17072)and Connecticut State Medical Society v. Oxford Health Plans (CT), Inc. (SC17071), the Court considered whether a physicians' association had standing to prosecute claims for violation of CUTPA and for injunctive relief against two HMO's. The Plaintiff had brought suit against the two HMO's alleging that they had engaged in unfair trade practices with respect to claims for payment made by the plaintiff's members. The HMO's both moved to strike the plaintiff's claims, asserting that the plaintiff was without standing because its claims were purely derivative of those of its members (who had agreed to arbitrate their claims against the HMO's). The trial court agreed, striking the plaintiff's claims. After transferring the cases to its own docket, the Supreme Court affirmed.

In State v. Miranda (SC17088)the Court reversed (via a truncated opinion) its decision in State v. Miranda, 245 Conn. 209 (1998) and held that, as a matter of law, there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction for assult in the first degree. The Court indicated that a full opinion would be issued at a later date.

In State v. Colon (SC16446) (Concurrence) (Concurrence) (Concurrence and Dissent), a jury convicted Ivo Colon of murder and capital felony and sentenced him death in connection with the death of two year old Keriana Tellado, whose head he repeatedly smashed against a shower wall. On direct appeal to the Supreme Court, Colon raised multiple challenges to both the guilt and penalty aspects of his conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed his conviction, but reversed the judgment imposing the death penalty and remanded the case for a new penalty phase hearing.

Although space limitations preclude a full review of the decision, two issues in particular are noteworthy. First, based on its 2003 decision in State v. Rizzo, 266 Conn. 171 – which was decided after Colon’s trial – the Court held that the trial court erred in instructing the jury on how to balance mitigating factors against aggravating factors. In particular, the trial failed to instruct the jurors that, in order to sentence Colon to death, they had to find that any aggravating factors did not merely outweigh any mitigating factors, but outweighed them beyond a reasonable doubt.

In addition, the Court rejected Colon’s claim that the trial court improperly denied his right of allocution, that is, his right to make an unsworn personal statement to the trial court and to present information in mitigation of his sentence. The Court held that neither the Practice Book, common law, nor the federal or state constitutions guaranteed a defendant a right of allocation within the structured setting of a capital sentencing hearing.

In Manifold v. Ragaglia (SC17150) the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the qaulified immunity extended by Section 17a-101e(b) to mandatory reporters of suspected child abuse extended to physicians who examine children whom the state already suspects as having been the victims of abuse. In so holding, the Court considered both the text and remedial purpose of the statute and concluded that qualified immunity for secondary reporters would only further the public's interest in rooting out child abuse. The Court also noted that such immunity was unlikely to be abused because intentional misconduct in reporting was a criminal offense and because the immunity would not shield acts of medical malpractice; i.e., while a secondary reporter is without liability for an incorrect (but good faith) report, the secondary reporter would still be subject to liability for any injuries caused by independent acts of medical malpractice committed in connection with the examination that led to the report of suspected abuse.

State v. Boyd (SC17192), involved the interpretation of General Statutes § 53a-39, which permits a court to “modify a definite sentence of three years or less” without the agreement of the state’s attorney. (Emphasis supplied.) The defendant had admitted to a parole violation and, as a result, was sentenced to two years and one day incarceration, plus two years of special parole. On appeal, the defendant argued that the two years of special parole should not be included in the determination of the length of his “definite sentence” and that the trial therefore erred in holding that it lacked the authority to modify his sentence without the agreement of the state’s attorney. The state argued the contrary position. The Supreme Court agreed with the defendant, concluding that the term “definite sentence” in § 53a-39 did not include the period of special parole.

In Gordon v. H.N.S. Management Co. (SC17139), the Court considered whether the defendant, a publicly held company which operates the public bus transit system in the Hartford, New Haven and Stamford areas under a management contract with the state department of transportation, was entitled to assert a defense of sovereign immunity. The plaintiffs in the consolidated cases had been occupants of busses that were involved in accidents. Both plaintiffs sued the defendant, arguing that it was required under state law to carry uninsured/underinsured motorist coverage and that they were entitled to such coverage for injuries they suffered in the accidents. The defendant argued that it was an “arm of the state” and, as such, was entitled to sovereign immunity. Applying a multi-factor test for determining whether a corporate entity is an “arm of the state,” the Supreme Court held that the evidence supported such a determination. The Court remanded the case was instructions to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaints.

Northeast Ct. Economic Alliance, Inc. v. ATC Partnership (SC17083) was an appeal from the trial court’s determination of “just compensation” in a condemnation case involving commercial property in Willimantic, CT. The property at issue suffered from environmental contamination, which condition was a central issue in the trial court’s determination of the fair market value of the property. The plaintiff contended, inter alia, that the trial court erred in considering, for valuation purposes, the availability of $3,000,000 in state grants that could be used to remediate the contamination. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the trial court properly included the availability of those funds in its analysis of the fair market value of the property.

In Friedman v. Meriden Orthopedic Group, P.C. (SC17047), the question before the Court was whether the trial court erred in excluding a portion of the plaintiff's expert's deposition testimony concerning the standard of care applicable to the defendant, an orthopedic surgeon, whose alleged negligence had injured the plaintiff during back surgery. General Statutes section 52-184c(d)(2) permits a health care provider who possesses sufficient training, experience and knowledge to testify to the standard of care in a particular field, even if the expert practices in a different field. The Court held that the plaintiff had failed to lay an adequate foundation during the deposition of his expert -- a board certified neuroradiologist -- as to whether he was testifying about the standard of care applicable to a neuroradiologist or to an orthopedic surgeon. Absent such a foundation, the trial court properly excluded the testimony of the plaintiff's expert on that issue.

In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Allard (SC17175), the Court considered whether a panel of arbitrators exceeded their authority under Connecticut’s “Lemon Law” (General Statutes section 42-179 et seq.) when they found that the defendant’s vehicle – a 2000 Jeep Cherokee Sport – was defective under the statute and required the plaintiff to give her a new Jeep Grand Cherokee Laredo as a replacement vehicle. (The Sport line had been discontinued.) The plaintiff argued that, under the Lemon Law statute, the arbitrators only had the power to award an “identical or comparable” replacement vehicle and that the Laredo was not comparable to the Sport. The Court rejected the plaintiff’s argument the issue of comparability was a question of law warranting de novo review, holding instead that whether the Laredo was comparable to the Sport was a question of fact and that substantial evidence in the record support the arbitrators’ factual finding.

In State v. Pepper (SC17075), the Court, in a per curiam opinion, affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision upholding the defendant’s sexual assault conviction. Adopting the Appellate Court’s opinion as its own, the Court held that the Appellate Court correctly rejected the defendant’s argument that the trial court improperly precluded him from cross-examining the victim about a prior suicide attempt. The defendant contended that evidence of the suicide attempt, which allegedly occurred because the victim was fearful that her husband would discover that she had engaged in an extra-marital affair, was relevant to his claim that the victim had fabricated her sexual assault claim because of the same fear.

In Huguenin v. Commissioner of Correction (SC17103), the Connecticut Supreme Court had granted certification to appeal the Appellate Court's decision summarily affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff's claim that the application of General Statutes § 18-100d to his criminal sentence violated the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution. In a per curiam opinion, the Court decided that it had improvidently granted certification.

In three separate appeals -- Cox v. Commissioner of Correction (SC17114); Hunter v. Commissioner of Correction (SC17115); and Harris v. Commissioner of Correction (SC17078) -- the Court considered the same principal issue: whether General Statutes § 18-98d entitles a prisoner to have each of his concurrent sentences, which were imposed on different dates, reduced by the same calendar days of presentence confinement. The Court concluded that, under § 18-98d, presentence confinement days credited to a prisoner’s original sentence cannot be credited to the prisoner’s subsequent concurrent sentence imposed on a different date.

In Dubreuil v. Witt (SC17143), a certified appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether, in a legal malpractice action tried to the bench, the trial court’s own knowledge of the standard of care and what constitutes a breach of that standard obviated the usual requirement that a plaintiff in a malpractice case must put on expert testimony of the standard of care and breach. Under the circumstances of the case, the Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision (in favor of the plaintiffs) that no expert testimony was needed.

In State v. Ramos (SC16829), the defendant was convicted of assault and having a deadly weapon in his motor vehicle. On appeal to the Appellate Court, that court reversed the conviction, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant had possessed the weapon (a hammer) in his vehicle with intent to use it as a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court on the sufficiency of the evidence issue. The Supreme Court also rejected the defendant’s arguments that: 1) the conviction violated his constitutional right to bear arms under article first, section 15 of the Connecticut Constitution; and 2) that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that the affirmative defense of self-defense did not apply to a charge of having a weapon in a motor vehicle.

In State v. Ouellette (SC16694), the defendant was charged with murder and elected to be tried before a three judge court, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82(b). The court convicted him of murder, rejected his defense of mental disease or defect and his alternative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. On appeal, the defendant argued that: 1) the trial court failed to ensure that his waiver of a jury trial was knowing and voluntary; 2) his waiver of a probable cause hearing was constitutionally infirm because the trial court failed properly to canvass him with respect to that waiver: 3) his right to due process was violated because the trial court failed properly to canvas him with respect to his plead of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect; and 4) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a presentence psychiatric examination. The Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments and affirmed the conviction.

The certified issue in Ankerman v. Mancuso (SC17086) was whether an attorney’s violation of Rule 1.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct precluded the attorney from enforcing a promissory note that a client executed for payment of legal services the attorney provided. Rule 1.8 prohibits a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest in a client’s property if the property is the subject matter of litigation in which the lawyer represents the client. The defendant attorney had acquired a mortgage in property that was the subject of litigation. Based on the fact, the trial court rejected the defendant’s lawsuit to enforce the promissory note on that ground that, by taking a mortgage on property subject to litigation in which he represented the plaintiff, the defendant had violated Rule 1.8. The Appellate Court rejected reversed. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that because the defendant sought only to enforce the promissory note – and not the mortgage – his violation of Rule 1.8 did not preclude his lawsuit to enforce the promissory note.

In Corcoran v. Dept. of Social Services (SC16955) (Dissent), the plaintiff appealed the decision of the Department of Social Services discontinuing her claim for medicaid benefits because her assets exceeded the allowable limit. The main asset at issue was a trust. The plaintiff’s principal argument on appeal was that the department failed to give collateral estoppel effect to a probate court ruling construing the trust in a particular manner. The Supreme Court held that the probate court’s construction did not have collateral estoppel effect because that court construed whether the assets of the trust were available to the plaintiff’s creditors, whereas the department construed the trust to determine whether the assets were available to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment upholding the decision of the department to discontinue the plaintiff’s benefits.

At issue in State v. Lopez (SC17123) was whether the defendant's attorney had a conflict of interest which had so tained the proceedings so as constitute structural error, thereby mandating a new trial. The attorney was a material witness to the alleged victim's recantation of her claims of abuse. After recanting her accusations the victim met privately with the defendant's attorney and -- according to the attorney -- told him her recantation was true and accurate. At trial, however, the alleged victim repudiated her recantation, testifying her mother and the defendant had forced her to falsely recant. In a chambers' conference at which the defendant was not present, the trial judge asked the defendant's attorney whether he intended to testify and the attorney stated he would not. The defendant was subsequently convicted of risk of injury to a minor. On appeal, the defendant (having retained new counsel) argued that the trial court should have conducted an inquiry to determine whether defendant's trial counsel had a conflict of interest, failed to properly so conclude, and failed to allow the defendant to be present in the chambers' conference. The Appellate Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court should have conducted a thorough inquiry with respect to the conflict issue, should have concluded that there was an actual conflict of interest, and that defendant was entitled to a new trial, notwithstanding that there had been no showing of actual prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there had been structural error below which so tainted the proceedings below that the defendant was entitlted to a new trial, even without a demonstration of prejudice.

In Davis v. Family Dollar Store (SC17058) the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, dismissed its certification as improvidently granted. Certification had originally been granted to consider whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that Section 52-292, the accidental failure of suit statute, did not apply where the original process had been timely provided to a process server, but was actually served after the statute of limitations had run.

In Butler v. Butler (SC17153) the Supreme Court held that, under Illinois law, the clear and convincing standard normally applied to proceedings to modify a joint custody order does not apply where both parties seek modification and request sole custody. Again applying Illinois law, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order awarding sole custody to the defendant was not against the clear weight of hte evidence.