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November 29, 2004
Last week the Connecticut Supreme Court issued opinions in four cases:
In Huguenin v. Commissioner of Correction (SC17103), the Connecticut Supreme Court had granted certification to appeal the Appellate Court's decision summarily affirming the trial court’s dismissal of the plaintiff's claim that the application of General Statutes § 18-100d to his criminal sentence violated the ex post facto clause of the federal Constitution. In a per curiam opinion, the Court decided that it had improvidently granted certification.
In three separate appeals -- Cox v. Commissioner of Correction (SC17114); Hunter v. Commissioner of Correction (SC17115); and Harris v. Commissioner of Correction (SC17078) -- the Court considered the same principal issue: whether General Statutes § 18-98d entitles a prisoner to have each of his concurrent sentences, which were imposed on different dates, reduced by the same calendar days of presentence confinement. The Court concluded that, under § 18-98d, presentence confinement days credited to a prisoner’s original sentence cannot be credited to the prisoner’s subsequent concurrent sentence imposed on a different date.
Posted by dklau at 07:55 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
November 23, 2004
The Supreme Court issued two decisions last week.
In Dubreuil v. Witt (SC17143), a certified appeal, the Supreme Court considered whether, in a legal malpractice action tried to the bench, the trial court’s own knowledge of the standard of care and what constitutes a breach of that standard obviated the usual requirement that a plaintiff in a malpractice case must put on expert testimony of the standard of care and breach. Under the circumstances of the case, the Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision (in favor of the plaintiffs) that no expert testimony was needed.
In State v. Ramos (SC16829), the defendant was convicted of assault and having a deadly weapon in his motor vehicle. On appeal to the Appellate Court, that court reversed the conviction, holding that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant had possessed the weapon (a hammer) in his vehicle with intent to use it as a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court reversed the Appellate Court on the sufficiency of the evidence issue. The Supreme Court also rejected the defendant’s arguments that: 1) the conviction violated his constitutional right to bear arms under article first, section 15 of the Connecticut Constitution; and 2) that the trial court improperly instructed the jury that the affirmative defense of self-defense did not apply to a charge of having a weapon in a motor vehicle.
Posted by dklau at 08:00 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
November 16, 2004
The Connecticut Supreme Court issued two decisions last week.
In State v. Ouellette (SC16694), the defendant was charged with murder and elected to be tried before a three judge court, pursuant to General Statutes § 54-82(b). The court convicted him of murder, rejected his defense of mental disease or defect and his alternative defense of extreme emotional disturbance. On appeal, the defendant argued that: 1) the trial court failed to ensure that his waiver of a jury trial was knowing and voluntary; 2) his waiver of a probable cause hearing was constitutionally infirm because the trial court failed properly to canvass him with respect to that waiver: 3) his right to due process was violated because the trial court failed properly to canvas him with respect to his plead of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect; and 4) the trial court improperly denied his motion for a presentence psychiatric examination. The Supreme Court rejected each of these arguments and affirmed the conviction.
The certified issue in Ankerman v. Mancuso (SC17086) was whether an attorney’s violation of Rule 1.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct precluded the attorney from enforcing a promissory note that a client executed for payment of legal services the attorney provided. Rule 1.8 prohibits a lawyer from acquiring a proprietary interest in a client’s property if the property is the subject matter of litigation in which the lawyer represents the client. The defendant attorney had acquired a mortgage in property that was the subject of litigation. Based on the fact, the trial court rejected the defendant’s lawsuit to enforce the promissory note on that ground that, by taking a mortgage on property subject to litigation in which he represented the plaintiff, the defendant had violated Rule 1.8. The Appellate Court rejected reversed. The Connecticut Supreme Court affirmed the Appellate Court’s decision, holding that because the defendant sought only to enforce the promissory note – and not the mortgage – his violation of Rule 1.8 did not preclude his lawsuit to enforce the promissory note.
Posted by dklau at 08:04 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
November 09, 2004
The Supreme Court issued two decisions last week.
In Corcoran v. Dept. of Social Services (SC16955) (Dissent), the plaintiff appealed the decision of the Department of Social Services discontinuing her claim for medicaid benefits because her assets exceeded the allowable limit. The main asset at issue was a trust. The plaintiff’s principal argument on appeal was that the department failed to give collateral estoppel effect to a probate court ruling construing the trust in a particular manner. The Supreme Court held that the probate court’s construction did not have collateral estoppel effect because that court construed whether the assets of the trust were available to the plaintiff’s creditors, whereas the department construed the trust to determine whether the assets were available to the plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment upholding the decision of the department to discontinue the plaintiff’s benefits.
At issue in State v. Lopez (SC17123) was whether the defendant's attorney had a conflict of interest which had so tained the proceedings so as constitute structural error, thereby mandating a new trial. The attorney was a material witness to the alleged victim's recantation of her claims of abuse. After recanting her accusations the victim met privately with the defendant's attorney and -- according to the attorney -- told him her recantation was true and accurate. At trial, however, the alleged victim repudiated her recantation, testifying her mother and the defendant had forced her to falsely recant. In a chambers' conference at which the defendant was not present, the trial judge asked the defendant's attorney whether he intended to testify and the attorney stated he would not. The defendant was subsequently convicted of risk of injury to a minor. On appeal, the defendant (having retained new counsel) argued that the trial court should have conducted an inquiry to determine whether defendant's trial counsel had a conflict of interest, failed to properly so conclude, and failed to allow the defendant to be present in the chambers' conference. The Appellate Court vacated the judgment, holding that the trial court should have conducted a thorough inquiry with respect to the conflict issue, should have concluded that there was an actual conflict of interest, and that defendant was entitled to a new trial, notwithstanding that there had been no showing of actual prejudice. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that there had been structural error below which so tainted the proceedings below that the defendant was entitlted to a new trial, even without a demonstration of prejudice.
Posted by dklau at 01:45 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
November 02, 2004
The state Supreme Court issued two decisions last week:
In Davis v. Family Dollar Store (SC17058) the Supreme Court, in a per curiam opinion, dismissed its certification as improvidently granted. Certification had originally been granted to consider whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that Section 52-292, the accidental failure of suit statute, did not apply where the original process had been timely provided to a process server, but was actually served after the statute of limitations had run.
In Butler v. Butler (SC17153) the Supreme Court held that, under Illinois law, the clear and convincing standard normally applied to proceedings to modify a joint custody order does not apply where both parties seek modification and request sole custody. Again applying Illinois law, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial court's order awarding sole custody to the defendant was not against the clear weight of hte evidence.
Posted by dklau at 06:18 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack