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October 26, 2004

Connecticut Supreme Court Issues Final Decisions in Rowland Subpoena Case

The Connecticut Supreme Court issued five decisions last week, including a long awaited decision, and two dissents, in the Rowland subpoena case.

In Office of the Governor v. Select Committee of Inquiry (SC17211) (Dissent) (Dissent) the Supreme Court considered whether the Select Committee of Inquiry established by the General Assembley to investigate former Governor John G. Rowland had the authority to subpoena the Governor to testify before it. On May 18, 2004 the Committe issued a subpoena to the Governor, directing him to appear and testify before the Committee on June 8, 2004. After the trial court denied the Governor's May 27, 2004 motion to quash, the Governor applied for direct appellate review by the Supreme Court pursuant to Section 52-265a and also requested that the proceedings be expedited. The Chief Justice granted the Governor's application on on June 10, 2004 and the case was heard, en banc, on June 18, 2004. The Court affirmed the trial court's denial of the Governor's motion to quash. In a lengthy decision co-authored by the five member majority, the Court reviewed federal and state law regarding the separation of powers, the text of the Connecticut Constitution, and its prior decision in Kinsella v. Jaekle, 192 Conn. 704 (1984) which involved impeachment proceedings commenced against the elected Probate Judge for the City of Hartford. The Court concluded that the Governor was not categorically immune from subpoena and likewise concluded that the issuance of the subpoena did not violate the separation of powers. In dissent, the Chief Justice and Justice Zarella argued that the only issue properly before the Court was the validity of a legislative subpoena enforceable only by the threat of impeachment (the Committee having represented it would not seek judicial enforcement of the subpoena if the Governor refused to comply). As such, the dissent concluded that the issue was a political question over which the Court should not have exercised jurisdiction.

In Metcalfe v. Sandford (SC17145) the Supreme Court held that an appeal from a decree of a Probate Court is not an 'action' within the meaning of Section 52-292(a), the accidental failure of suit statute. In so holding, the Supreme Court noted that there are several classes of cases -- e.g. zoning appeals and administrative appeals -- which must be brought very quickly after the to be complained of error and to which Section 52-292(a) has been held not to apply. Concluding that the sort timeline for taking a probate appeal stemmed from a similar legislative purpose as thant underlying the short timelines in zoning and administrative appeals -- speady resolution to protect legitimate reliance interests -- the Supreme Court concluded that, if Section 52-292(a) were held to apply to probate appeals, confidence in the finality of probate orders would "evaporate" resulting in a potentnially long period of uncertainty as to the status of the estate.

In Franco v. East Shore Development, Inc. (SC16893)the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the Appellate Court and held that a party may intervene in a proceeding to confirm an arbitration award. Relying upon the dissent of Chief Judge Lavery from the decision of the Appellate Court, the Supreme Court concluded that the fact that nothing in Section 52-417 prohibits intervention and that, so long as the intervenor has the requisite legal interest in the matter, intervention is proper even if the intervenor did not have standing to bring the application in the first instance.

In Board of Education v. Wallingford Education Assn (SC17141) the Supreme Court applied the positive assurance test and concluded that the trial court had erred in concluding that a dispute between the parties concerning the ownership of stock proceeds from the demutualization of Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield was not within the scope of the arbitration clause in the parties' collective bargaining agreement. In concluding that the dispute was not arbitrable, the trial court relied upon the fact that nothing in the collective bargaining agreement contemplated the demutualization of Anthem Blue Cross and Blue Shield and the fact that the stock proceeds had been paid to the Town of Wallingford and not the Board of Education. Reversing, the Supreme Court held that the foreseeability of the particular dispute is not relevant to whether it is arbitrable and likewise concluded that it could not be said with positive assurance that the dispute was not within the scope of the parties' agreement to arbitrate. The Supreme Court also held that the effect of the fact that the stock proceeds had been paid to the Town, rather than to the Board of Education was a substantive issue for the arbitrators to decide.\

In State v. Eric M. (SC17074)the Supreme Court considered whether the Appellate Court correctly concluded that a trial judge proeprly denied a motion to recuse himself from a criminal sentancing because the judge had read a news article in which the defendant was quoted concerning the events that were the subject of the underlying conviction. In affirming the Appellate Court's decision that the trial judge was not obligated to recuse himself, the Supreme Court noted that trial judges have broad discretion to consider extrajudicial statements and the defendant did not challenge the veracity of any of the statements attributed to him by the news article.

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October 19, 2004

The state Supreme Court released one decision last week: In State v. Kirk R. (SC16940) (Concurrence) the Supreme Court considered whether the fact that a victim is less than ten years old is a substantive element that must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt before a mandatory minimum sentance could be imposed pursuant to Section 53a-70(b), or wether it was merely a 'sentancing factor' to be considered by the Court. On certified appeal the Supreme Court conducted a thorough examination of the text and legislative history of Section 53a-70(b) and concluded that the Appellate Court had erred in concluding that the question of the victim's age was merely a sentancing factor. The Supeme Court also concluded, however, that the error was harmless because the question of the victims' age in this case was uncontested and because 'overwhelming evidence' established that the victims were, in fact, less than ten years old.

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October 12, 2004

Last week, the Connecticut Supreme Court issued decisions in three cases:

In State v. Peeler (Concurring and Dissenting) (Dissent) (SC16362, SC16354)a divided Supreme Court sitting en banc affirmed the jury's verdict of guily and vacated a life sentance imposed by the trial court after the jury had deadlocked on the question of whether to impose the death penalty against the defendant for his part in planning the murder of a witness to a separate killing by the defendant and the witnesses' mother. On appeal, the defendant raised a number of claims concerning the applicability of the Pinkerton doctrine, all of which the Court rejected on their merits. The Court, however, did hold that the defendant had been wrongly denied access to the mental health records of a key witness, but also held that the error was hamrless because the State had offered considerable other evidence on the subject of the witness' testimony and because the defendant had been able to thoroughly test the witness' credibility using a considerable amount of other evidence. The Court also rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court had erred and acted improperly in failing to disclose to his counsel certain potentially exculpatory evidence that had been presented to the court for in camera review, holding that the defendant suffered no prejudice because the evidence was ultimately provided to him and introduced at trial. With respect to the State's appeal, the Court held that the trial court had improperly denied the State's motion for a mistrial when the jury indicated it was deadlocked and that the trial court had improperly suggested to the jury that the ultimate responsibility for determining the defendant's fate did not lie with the jury. In so doing, the Court rejected certain alternate grounds for affirmance proffered by the defendant.

In Tetreault v. Eslick (SC17104), a medical malpractice case, the plaintiffs sued the defendants for negligence in failing properly to diagnose and treat their son's Lyme disease. The defendants denied the plaintiffs' allegations of negligence and asserted a special defense of superceding or intervening cause, based upon medical treatment provided to the son by another physician. After trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in submitted the defendants' special defense to the jury.

The Connecticut Supreme Court held that the general verdict rule precluded appellate review of the plaintiffs' claim. Under the general verdict rule, a court must presume that the jury found all issues in favor of the defendant. Because the record did not disclose whether the jury rejected the plaintiffs' negligence allegations or whether it accepted the defendants' special defense, and because the plaintiffs had not challenged the verdict insofar as it was based upon the former possibility, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment.

In Hartford Steam Boiler Inspection & Ins. Co. v. Underwriters at Lloyd's & Cos. Collective (SC17024), the plaintiff appealed the trial court’s order remanding a matter to an arbitration panel to clarify its award. The defendant argued that the remand order was not a final judgment and, therefore, that the Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court agreed that the remand order was proper under General Statutes section 52-418 and that it was not a final judgment nor an appealable interlocutory order.

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October 04, 2004

The Connecticut Supreme Court issued decisions in three cases last week:

In Mamudovski v. BIC Corp. (SC17069), the plaintiff filed a complaint alleging, inter alia, that she was injured as the result of the negligence of her former employer. The trial court granted the defendant’s oral motion for summary judgment on the negligence claim, based on the plaintiff’s admission in her complaint that she was injured in the course of her employment and, therefore, that her exclusive remedy was under the Workers’ Compensation Act. On appeal to the Appellate Court, the plaintiff successfully argued that the trial court had improperly granted the defendant’s oral summary judgment motion because the court failed to comply with the procedures governing such motions. The Supreme Court granted certification to appeal, but then determined that the appeal should be dismissed because certification was improvidently granted.

In State v. Mann (SC16996), a significant Fourth Amendment decision, the Court considered whether the warrantless patdown of the defendant in his apartment violated his constitutional rights. When the police conducted the patdown, they found drugs, which ultimately led to the defendant’s conviction on several drug charges. Prior to trial, the defendant unsuccessfully moved to suppress the drugs as the product of an unreasonable search. The Appellate Court agreed with the defendant. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the state argued that the warrantless patdown was constitutionally permissible because the defendant’s conduct when he voluntarily opened the door to his apartment and saw the police – he tried to close the door with his left hand while reaching into his pocket with his right hand – gave rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the defendant was armed and dangerous. The Supreme Court agreed and held that, under such circumstances, a limited patdown search of the defendant for weapons was not unconstitutional.

In New England Pipe Corp. v. Northeast Corridor Foundation (SC17065), the Court considered whether the trial court had jurisdiction, under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-422, to grant relief in the context of an interlocutory appeal from a decision of an arbitration panel. The parties had agreed to submit certain issues to binding arbitration. During the arbitration, the plaintiff argued that the defendant had failed to make a timely expert disclosure. The arbitration panel extended the deadline for such disclosures over the objection of the plaintiff. The plaintiff then sought an order pendente lite in Superior Court, pursuant to § 52-422, enjoining the arbitration on the ground that the extension of expert disclosure deadlines had fundamentally altered the parties’ arbitration agreement. The defendant argued that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Supreme Court held that the Superior Court had jurisdiction over the case, but that it lacked the statutory authority under § 52-422 to grant the relief requested. Specifically, § 52-422 authorizes a court to grant such relief as is “necessary” to protect a party’s rights pending arbitration. The Court held, however, that the relief the plaintiff sought was not necessary. The Court remanded the case to the trial court with direction to deny the plaintiff’s request for injunctive relief on its merits.

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