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September 29, 2004
U.S. Supreme Court Grants Certiorari in New London Eminent Domain Case
Yesterday, the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear an appeal challenging the decision of the Connecticut Supreme Court in Kelo v. New London, in which the Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the taking of property for the purpose of private redevelopment, as part of an effort to revitalize the City of New London, was constitutional. Click here for the order granting the petition for certiorari.
Posted by dklau at 09:02 AM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
September 27, 2004
The Connecticut Supreme Court issued two decisions last week. In Tarnowsky v. Socci (SC16992) the Court was faced with the question of whether the two year statute of limitations in tort actions set forth in Section 52-584 does not begin to run until the plaintiff becomes aware, or reasonably should have become aware, of the identity of the putative tortfeasor. In a case of first impression in Connecticut, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Appellate Court adopting the majority rule that the identity of the putative tortfeasor is an essential element of the plaintiff's cause of action. Holding that there was no principled distinction between the identity of the putative tortfeasor and other key elements of a tort claim, the Supreme Court concluded that without such information, a plantiff had not suffered an actionable harm within the meaning of Section 52-584.
In State v. Perkins (SC17099) (Dissent) the Supreme Court re-affirmed the constitutionality of the so-called 'waiver rule' under which a criminal defendant waives the right to appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss made at the close of the State's case arguing the insufficiency of the evidence if the defendant thereafter elects to present evidence in his/her own case. First, noting that there is no constitutional right to an appeal from a criminal conviction, the Court held that the 'waiver rule' affects only the right to an appeal from a criminal conviction, not the underlying trial. Second, the Court rejected the appellant's claim that the waiver rule violated his right to have the State prove every element beyond a reasonable doubt; his right to present a defense; and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court also denied the appellant's request to exercise its supervisory powers and not apply the waiver rule in the context of the specific case, holding that its application was not unfair simply because it required him to make a strategic choice about how he would defend his case. Acknowledging that the choice was a difficult one, the Court nonetheless concluded that it was no more unfair than the choice every defendant must make in deciding whether or not to waive his/her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrmination by testifying in his/her own defense.
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September 21, 2004
The Connecticut Supreme Court
decided three cases last week. In Stauton v. Planning & Zoning Commission (SC17107), the Court
considered whether property owners in the same zoning area are aggrieved within
the meaning of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 8-8 for the purposes of challenging a decision
of a municipal zoning authority.
Reviewing the text, noting the legislative history, and discussing its
prior decisions considering Section 8-8, the Court concluded that only property
owners whose land actually abutted or were within 100 feet of a parcel were
aggrieved – and thus entitled to seek judicial review of the zoning authority’s
decision – pursuant to Section 8-8.
In State
v. Jenkins (SC16871), the
Supreme Court considered whether the Appellate Court properly concluded that
use of a criminal defendant’s psychiatric records for impeachment purposes
constituted reversible error where the defendant objected to their introduction
and claimed that the trial court’s order holding that he had waived the
psychiatrist-patient privilege violated his constitutional right to testify and
to present a defense. The Court first
held that the trial court had erred in allowing the State to use the
defendant’s psychiatric records to impeach him on cross-examination, holding
that they were privileged pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-146d and that the
defendant had not waived the privilege, as the State had successfully argued at
trial. The Court also held, however,
that the Appellate Court erred in concluding that the trial court’s error was
one of constitutional magnitude. As
such, the Supreme Court held that the trial court’s error had to be examined
through the prism of the harmless error doctrine. In that context, however, the Court held that
the records were of minimal probative value and their use in cross-examination
did not improperly prejudice the defendant.
In Sweeney
v. Sweeney (SC16978)
(Dissent),
the Court considered whether a pendente lite order directing that a minor child be enrolled in
a Catholic school for the fall 2002 semester was subject to immediate appellate
review and whether it ought consider the question notwithstanding that the
parties’ dispute had been rendered moot by the entry of judgment of
dissolution. First considering the
question of whether it should decide the matter notwithstanding that the
dispute had been rendered moot, the Court concluded that the dispute was one
capable of repetition, yet evading appellate review. Reversing the decision of the Appellate
Court, the Supreme Court also concluded that the dispute was analogous to that
in Madigan v. Madigan, 224
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September 18, 2004
Looking Forward to the First Monday in October
The United States Supreme Court opens its new term on Monday, October 4. The Court is currently scheduled to hear 12 cases during the month of October, including two very important cases concerning the constitutionality of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. For more information on the Court's October cases, including access to the parties' briefs, click here or here.
Posted by dklau at 04:31 PM | Comments (0) | TrackBack
September 14, 2004
The Supreme Court issued decisions in five cases last week. In Nussbaum
v. Kimberly Timbers, Ltd. (SC17070), the principal issue considered by the
Court was whether, under a broad arbitration clause, an arbitrator could decide
whether a home improvement contract was unenforceable because the contractor
had failed to comply with all of the requirements of the New Home Construction
Contractors Act, Conn. Gen. Stat. § 20-417a, et seq. The Court answered
the question in the affirmative, holding that the question was one arising out
of or relating to the parties’ contract, and was within the scope of its broad
arbitration clause. The Court then
rejected the homeowners’ claim that it is for the court, not for the
arbitrator, to decide whether a contract is not enforceable because it is
contrary to public policy, holding that it is for the arbitrator,
distinguishing situations in which one party challenges the existence of the putative
contract and those where a party claims that the arbitration clause itself was
procured by fraud, duress, etc.
In Craig
v. Stafford Construction, Inc. (SC17073), the issue before
the Court was whether absolute immunity attached to an allegedly defamatory
statement made by a complainant in the course of an investigation by the Hartford
Police Department into a charge against one of its officers. The Court answered the question in the
affirmative, holding that sound public policy required the full and free
disclosure of information concerning alleged police misconduct and that the
investigation had enough of the trappings of a judicial proceeding to
qualify as a quasi-judicial proceedings such that statements made therein were
entitled to absolute immunity.
The principal issue
before the Court in Bloom
v. Gershon (SC17030,
SC17031,
SC17032)
– a medical malpractice case involving a physician who was employee of the
state – was whether General Statutes § 4-160 (governing claims against the
state) gave the claims commissioner authority to waive the state’s sovereign
immunity and grant a claimant permission to file an apportionment complaint
against the state, pursuant to General Statutes § 52-102(b). Following the reasoning of its prior decision
in Lostritto v. Community Action Agency of New Haven,
Inc., 269
In State v. Jones-Richards (SC17159), the defendant was charged in a two-part information with driving a motor vehicle while intoxicated and as a “second offender” in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a(g). She pled guilty to the underlying offense (Part A of the information) and was sentenced for that offense. The trial court then tried the second offender claim (Part B of the information), as to which the defendant had pled not guilty, found her guilty thereof and sentenced her for that offense. The state subsequently asked the trial court to vacate the sentences that had been imposed on both parts of the information and to resentence the defendant on the second offender charge. The Court complied with that request. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try her on the second offender charges after it had already sentenced her for the underlying offense. She further argued that the trial court had improperly vacated her sentence on the underlying defense before re-sentencing her as a second offender. The Supreme Court rejected these arguments. It held that the original sentencing was illegal (because the defendant had to be tried and sentenced on both parts of the information at the same time), but that the law permitted a trial court to correct an illegal sentence any time before the sentence had been executed. Because the trial had stayed the execution of the original sentence, it retained jurisdiction over the case and could correct the original sentencing error. Accordingly, the court affirmed the conviction.
In State v. New England Health Care Employees Union (Dissent)(SC17044), the Court considered whether an arbitration award reinstating an employee to his job with the Department of Mental Retardation violated a public policy against putting department clients at risk of abuse. The Court held that, although the arbitrator found that the employee had abused a client, the arbitrator had not found that the abuse was intentional, nor had he specifically referred to General Statutes §17a-247a in connection with his abuse finding. Under these circumstances, the Court held that confirmation of the award would not violate public policy.
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The Court issued four decisions last week. In Knapp
v. Knapp (SC16954),
the defendant entered into a separation agreement which provided that the
defendant would pay weekly alimony until certain events occurred, including the
plaintiff’s cohabitation with another person.
In this appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in
holding that it lacked authority to enforce this provision retroactively in
response to the defendant’s allegation that the plaintiff had been cohabitating
with another individual. The Court
concluded that the trial court’s finding that the plaintiff was not
cohabitating was not clearly erroneous and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. In State
v. DeJesus (SC16782),
the defendant was convicted of kidnapping and sexual assault. On appeal, he argued that the trial court
deprived him of his constitutional right to confront witnesses and present a
defense when it precluded him from questioning the victim about her prior
history of prostitution. The trial court
had precluded the admission of such evidence based on the state’s rape shield
statute, General Statutes § 54-86(f).
The Supreme Court disagreed and held that the evidence was relevant to
the defendant’s defense that the victim had consented to have intercourse. Accordingly, it reversed the trial court’s
judgment and remanded the case for a new trial. River
Bend Associates, Inc. v. Zoning Commission (SC17026)
and River
Bend Associates, Inc. v. Planning Commission (SC17027)
both involved appeals from decisions of the Town of Simsbury Planning and
Zoning Commission in connection with the plaintiffs’ effort to build affordable
housing in the town. The Supreme Court
affirmed in part, and reversed in part, the trial court’s decision sustaining
the plaintiffs’ appeal from the zoning commission.
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September 07, 2004